University of Texas at El Paso

ScholarWorks@UTEP
Departmental Technical Reports (CS)

Computer Science

6-2020

Preference for Boys Does Not Necessarily Lead to a Gender
Disbalance: A Realistic Example
Olga Kosheleva
The University of Texas at El Paso, olgak@utep.edu

Vladik Kreinovich
The University of Texas at El Paso, vladik@utep.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.utep.edu/cs_techrep
Part of the Applied Mathematics Commons

Comments:
Technical Report: UTEP-CS-20-65
Recommended Citation
Kosheleva, Olga and Kreinovich, Vladik, "Preference for Boys Does Not Necessarily Lead to a Gender
Disbalance: A Realistic Example" (2020). Departmental Technical Reports (CS). 1471.
https://scholarworks.utep.edu/cs_techrep/1471

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Computer Science at ScholarWorks@UTEP. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Departmental Technical Reports (CS) by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UTEP. For more information, please contact lweber@utep.edu.

Preference for Boys Does Not Necessarily Lead to
a Gender Disbalance: A Realistic Example
Olga Kosheleva and Vladik Kreinovich
University of Texas at El Paso
500 W. University
El Paso, TX 79968, USA
olgak@utep.edu, vladik@utep.edu
Abstract
Intuitively, it seems that cultural preference for boys should lead to
a gender disbalance – more boys than girls. This disbalance is indeed
what is often observed, and this disbalance is what many models predict.
However, in this paper, we show, on a realistic example, that preference
for boys does not necessarily lead to a gender disbalance: in our simplified
example, boys are clearly preferred, but still there are exactly as many
girls as there are boys.

1

Formulation of the Problem

Preference for boys – a cultural phenomenon. In many cultures, it is
important to have a son. So, if a family has a daughter, the parents continue
to produce children until they have the desired son.
In such situations, it is reasonable to expect gender disbalance. Intuitively, it seems that this will lead to a gender disbalance, i.e., that we will have
more boys than girls. Such a disbalance is indeed observed in many countries
where cultures have such a preference, e.g., in Thailand.
This disbalance is predicted by several models of this phenomenon; see,
e.g., [1].
What we do in this paper. In this paper, we consider a simplified model
of preference for sons in which, somewhat surprisingly, this preference does not
lead to a gender disbalance.
Our main simplifying assumption is based on the fact that in many countries
with a strong preference for boys, most people are poor, they cannot afford to
have too many children – even one child is not easy to support. For such
countries, it is reasonable to make a simplifying assumption that, once the
family gets a son, they stop producing children.

1

Comment. To make it understandable to people who are interested in demographic questions but may not be mathematically sophisticated, we have tried
to make this example as mathematically clear as possible.
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Description of Our Example

Deriving the formula. Let us make an additional simplifying assumption that
each new child can be a boy or a girl with equal probability 0.5, and that genders
of different children are statistically independent. In reality, the probabilities
of having a boy and having a girl are slightly different form 0.5, but for our
approximate computations, we can ignore this difference.
So, with probability 1/2 = 2−1 , the first child is a son. In this case, according
to our assumption, the family will stop producing children. So, in this case, the
family will have 0 girls.
If the first child is a girl, then the family produces a second child. With
probability 1/2, this second child is a son. Since the genders of different children
are statistically independent, the overall probability of this situation is equal to
(1/2) · (1/2) = 2−2 . In this situation, the family has 1 girl.
If the second child is also a girl, then the family produces a third child. With
probability 1/2, this third child is a son. Since the genders of different children
are statistically independent, the overall probability of this situation is equal to
(1/2) · (1/2) · (1/2) = 2−3 . In this situation, the family has 2 girls.
In general, the family can have n girls before they have a boy. The probability
of such situation, when we have n girls followed by a boy, is equal to
(1/2) · . . . · (1/2) (n times) · (1/2) = 2−(n+1) .

(1)

In this model, each family has exactly one boy. The expected number g of
girls in the family is equal to
g = 0 · 2−1 + 1 · 2−2 + 2 · 2−3 + . . . + n · 2−(n+1) + . . .

(2)

Computing the formula. Let us find the value g. For this purpose, let us
multiply both sides of the formula (2) by 2; then, each term n · 2−(n+1) becomes
2 · n · 2−(n+1) = n · (2 · 2−(n+1) ) = 2−n ,
so we get
2 · g = 0 · 20 + 1 · 2−1 + 2 · 2−2 + . . . + n · 2−n + . . .

(3)

Now, we can subtract, term by term, the formula (2) from the formula (3). Each
term in both formulas has the form const · 2−k , for some natural number k. It
is therefore natural to subtract terms corresponding to the same k.
• In the formula (2), we have k = n + 1, so n = k − 1, and the coefficient at
this term is n = k − 1.
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• In the formula (3), this term corresponds to k = n, so the coefficient at
this term is n = k.
Thus, when we subtract the two expressions, each difference becomes
k · 2−k − (k − 1) · 2−k = 2−k ,
so we get:
g = 2 · g − g = 0 · 20 + (1 − 0) · 2−1 + (2 − 1) · 2−2 + (3 − 2) · 2−3 + . . . =
2−1 + 2−2 + 2−3 + . . . + 2−n + . . .

(4)

To compute the right-hand side of the expression (4), we can use the same trick:
double both sides, as a result we get
2 · g = 20 + 2−1 + 2−2 + . . . + 2−(n−1) + . . .

(5)

When we subtract (4) from (5), all terms 2−k cancel each other, expect for the
term 20 :
g = 2 · g − g = 20 + (2−1 − 2−1 ) + (2−2 − 2−2 ) + . . . = 20 = 1.

(6)

Conclusion. So, for each boy, we have, on average, g = 1 girl – which shows
that there is no gender disbalance, we have exactly as many boys as girls.
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